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SHAPE MARK (TRADE DRESS) DISTINCTIVENESS:
A COMPARATIVE INQUIRY INTO U.S. AND EU
TRADEMARK LAW
QADIR QEIDARY
ABSTRACT
Nowadays, the increasing application of visual elements, as
non-traditional trademarks, to convey commercial information has
brought about some new challenges to pioneer legal systems. In this
regard, the question of shape marks’ (trade dress) distinctiveness has
also caused some hot debates in U.S. and EU trademark law. Indeed, the most challenging legal question before those legal jurisdictions is about the method of transplanting the concept of trademark
distinctiveness into the mechanism through which shape marks,
as visual mediums, perform a trademark communicative function.
Technically, the indefinite nature of shape marks or trade dress
marks and lack of a definitive or pre-intended source of meaning
has made them unpredictable in terms of distinctiveness examination. This Article has employed a comparative perspective to investigate the U.S. and EU’s historical and current legal positions towards
shape marks’ distinctiveness. This Article has also found that both
the U.S. “ontological tests” and EU “significant departure criterion”
suffer from the heavy emphasis on the “distinguishing” capability
among other comparable shapes or designs and ignorance of the
“source-identifying” function of shape marks. Furthermore, their
endeavors for posing the question of inherent distinctiveness in a
contextual environment will make the normative parts of the tests
useless and cause time and cost expenditures. Finally, having
considered the competitive and public interests in EU and U.S.
trademark law, this Article suggests that relying on a market-led
approach, in which the collected information from the relevant consumers is the most decisive method in finding distinctive character.
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INTRODUCTION
Using visual signs as an effective medium to convey specific
information has occupied a significant part of modern commercial
communications.1 Technically speaking, visual signs can mutely
or intuitively communicate the meanings that even lingual mediums could not convey.2 Meanwhile, the trademark system’s role has
classically been defined as a communicative structure that transmits the relevant information to minimize search costs and simultaneously maximize economic utility.3 The expansive scope of
the modern trademark system and teleological interpretation of its
function has resulted in incorporating product shapes or designs
and product packaging into the protective umbrella of trademark
law.4 It seems that it has been recognized as a well-established
principle that almost any sign, regardless of its innate characteristics, which can distinctively convey commercial information,
could be posed as a protectable trademark in the pioneer legal systems like EU and U.S. law.5 From a theoretical point of view, as

See Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections
on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and
Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 528–29 (1997).
2 GUNTHER KRESS & THEO VAN LEEUWEN, READING IMAGES: THE GRAMMAR
OF VISUAL DESIGN 1 (1996), stating that “[it is] [i]ntend[ed] to provide inventories of the major compositional structures which have become established
as conventions in the course of the history of visual semiotics, and to analyse
how they are used to produce meaning by contemporary image-makers.”
3 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 270–72 (1988). Landes and Posner argued
that the total cost of a good is an aggregate of the nominal price and the cost
of searching with respect to that good. Id. When search costs are reduced, social
welfare is increased because the cost premium a brand owner charges for trademarked goods is less than the cost of a search without the trademarks. Id.
4 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (“‘[t]rade
dress’—a category that originally included only the packaging, or ‘dressing,’ of a
product ... in recent years has been expanded by many Courts of Appeals to
encompass the design of a product.”).
5 MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. AND COMPETITION L., STUDY ON THE
OVERALL FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN TRADE MARK SYSTEM 66 (2011)
[hereinafter STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING] (observing that “[i]t seems
to be an accepted principle that basically all imaginable forms of signs which can
be perceived by the human senses and hence are able to perform a communication
function are also able to distinguish goods or services of one enterprise from
those of another”).
1
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Professor Economides rightly argues: “[t]he degree of a trademark’s
success is a function of: (a) the consumer’s ability to recall the mark
and its associated features; (b) the inability of others to use a confusingly similar mark; and (c) the reluctance of firms to change the
variety and quality features of the trade-marked product.”6 Indeed,
when a product shape or design is utilized as a trademark, any visible piece of it could comprise a considerable amount of indicative
commercial information that may not be expressed by words concisely.7 Comparing to other traditional trademarks, particularly
word marks, that characteristic of shape marks, or in its U.S. name
trade dress marks,8 could prove this fact that those newfound
marks could even perform the trademark system’s objectives more
efficiently.9 Nevertheless, in a legal context, the unique nature
of shape marks has caused challenging debates concerning the
proper method of applying the essential provisions of trademark
law for them.10 One of the enigmatic inquiries in this regard is
about transplanting the concept of trademark distinctiveness into
the mechanism through which shape marks, as visual mediums,
perform a trademark communicative function.11 The present Article
will investigate this question through a comparative analysis between U.S. and EU trademark law.
Under EU trademark law, product shapes or designs and
product packaging could obtain community trademark registration
provided that they “guarantee the identity of the origin of the

Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
523, 527–28 (1988); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in
1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274–75 (stating that “[o]ne is to protect the public so
it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the wellestablished rule of law protecting both the public and the trademark owner.”)
7 See Aoki, supra note 1, at 528.
8 The present Article uses “trade dress marks” and “shape marks” interchangeably.
9 See Désirée Fields & Alasdair Muller, Going Against Tradition: The Effect of
Eliminating the Requirement of Representing a Trademark Graphically on Applications for Non-Traditional Trademarks, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 238,
238 (2017).
10 Id. at 241.
11 Id.
6
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marked product or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the
product or service from others which have another origin.”12 In this
respect, they can be protected as inherently distinctive and, there
is no prerequisite of prior market use or acquired distinctiveness.13
The removal of the “graphical representation” requisite from the
EU Trademark Directive in 2015 shows the EU legislature’s growing willingness to expand the scope of trademark protection and
ease the product shapes’ or designs’ protection under trademark
law.14 The EU Trademark Directive (TMD) Article 4(1) and
EUTMR Article 7(1) have outlined trademark’s register-ability
through several negative conditions that any registrable mark
should be devoid of even in the case of meeting the general positive requirements that TMD Article 3 and EUTMR Article 4 have
required.15 According to those prohibitive provisions, functional and
aesthetic shapes or designs could not carry out a source-identifying
function and obviously could not obtain acquired distinctiveness
even subsequent to establishing a successful market use.16 However, neither the removal of “graphical representation” nor the
other relevant regulations in EU trademark law have specified
the mechanism upon which the EU courts can examine the distinctive character of shape marks.17 Therefore, it has left the door
open to the EU courts to articulate a normative criterion for shape
marks’ distinctiveness.18

Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 30; see Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. Ballantine & Son,
Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6244, ¶¶ 22, 24; Case C-39/97, Canon v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 1998 E.C.R. I-5525, ¶ 28; Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P,
Freixenet v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2011 E.C.R. I-10205,
¶ 42; Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 29.
13 See Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, ¶ 32.
14 Fields & Muller, supra note 9, at 238.
15 See Council Directive 2015/2436, art. 4(1), 2015 O.J. (L 336), 7–8 (EU);
Council Regulation 2017/1001, art. 7(1), 2017 O.J. (L 154), 8–9. But see Council
Directive 2015/2436, supra, at art. 3, 7; Council Regulation 2017/1001, supra,
at art. 4, 8.
16 See Council Directive 2015/2436, supra note 15, at art. 4(1), 7–8; Council
Regulation 2017/1001, supra note 15, at art. 7(1), 8–9.
17 Fields & Muller, supra note 9, at 240–41.
18 Id. at 238, 241.
12
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In the U.S. trademark law, a trade dress mark is defined as
“[t]he overall appearance and image in the marketplace of a product
or a commercial enterprise.”19 From a historical point of view, protection of trade dress has included product dressing (packaging)
and product designs.20 Meanwhile, they were originally protected
under common law action for unfair competition.21
By applying the language of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
and its amendment in 1988, any unfair competitive practices caused
by applying “word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [or any] ... false designation of origin, [and] a false
or misleading description of fact”22 was inhibited. Subsequently,
the U.S. courts commenced gradually to consider trade dress as an
exclusive nontechnical trademark.23 Like EU trademark law, there

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (citing
John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)).
It is also defined as “[t]otal image and overall appearance ... [which] may include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics,
or even particular sales techniques.” Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 764–65 n.1
(quoting Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.
1989) and John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 980).
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (AM. L. INST.
1993). “Trade dress” traditionally includes the appearance of labels, wrappers,
and containers used in packaging a product as well as displays and other materials
used in presenting the product to prospective purchasers. Id. The design features of the product itself are also sometimes included within the meaning of
“trade dress,” although the substantive rules applicable to the protection of
product designs differ in some respects from those applicable to packaging and
related subject matter. Id.
21 Id.
22 Lanham Trademark Protection Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
23 Amy B. Berge, Trade Dress Protection: What’s Left for the States?, 27 N.
KY. L. REV. 1055, 1056–57 (2000); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (holding that the term ‘trade-mark’ “includes any
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof ... [adopted and used by
a manufacturer or merchant] to identify and distinguish his goods ... from
those manufactured or sold by others”); S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 40 (1988)
(explaining that “as written, Section 43(a) appears to deal only with false
descriptions or representations and false designations of geographic origin.
Since its enactment in 1946, however, it has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal law of unfair competition. For example, it has been
applied to cases involving the infringement of unregistered marks, violations
of trade dress and certain nonfunctional configurations of goods and actionable
false advertising claims.” Kipling v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 120 F. 631, 636 (2d
19
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is no directive protocol on the applicable method for examining the
trade dress marks’ distinctiveness.24 It has opened a room for courts
to address this question in a dynamic legal environment. In the
U.S. trademark law, courts’ approaches towards trade dress marks’
distinctiveness could be divided into two main categories, namely
ontological25 and traditional.26
The present Article has comparatively analyzed the EU and
U.S. trademark provisions regarding the applicable methods for
examination of distinctive character in product shapes or designs
and product packaging. It comprises four main parts. Part I is
dedicated to juxtapose the principle of equal treatment and the
imposed restrictive provisions on shape mark distinctiveness.27
Part II deals with the complexity of developing a fitting test for
shape marks as visual-based signs and analytical comparison between the methods that are currently applied in U.S. and EU trademark law for assessing the distinctive character of shape marks.28
Part III investigates the impact of word mark tests on the shape
mark distinctiveness.29 Finally, Part IV talks about the relationship

Cir. 1903) (“it is customary to publish books with ornamental designs stamped or
printed on the covers, but no one ... ever imagined that such pictures and ornaments were the trade-marks of the authors of the books”).
24 Compare Lanham Trademark Protection Act § 43(a), with Council Regulation 2017/1001, supra note 15, at art. 7(1), 8–9.
25 The term “ontological” for trade dress marks’ distinctiveness was first
used by Justice Breyer in Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164. The Court stated, “[i]t is
the source-distinguishing ability of a mark not its ontological status as color,
shape, fragrance, word, or sign that permits it to serve these basic purposes.”
Id. This Article uses the term for the courts that believe trade dress marks
could be inherently distinctive and that character should be assessed based
on the innate features of the shape or design for which trademark protection
is sought. It is worth saying that Professor Dinwoodie has employed the same
term for courts with the aforementioned approach. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA
L. REV. 613, 616 (1999) [hereinafter The Death of Ontology].
26 See The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 614.
27 See infra Part I.
28 See infra Part II; Annette Kur, Fundamental concerns in the harmonization of (European) trademark law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 164 (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Harmonization of Trademark Law].
29 See infra Part III.
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between public and competitive considerations and normative distinctiveness criteria.30
I.THE EU QUASI-EQUALITY AND U.S. COMPLEX DUALITY
According to EU trademark law, distinctive trademarks are
capable of identifying the commercial source of products or services
and adequate for distinguishing them among the other competitive
products or services in the market.31 Meanwhile, they should
perform their function without any risk or likelihood of confusion to consumers,32 whose perception plays the central role in
examining the distinctiveness.33 There is no explicit requirement
that may change the scope of protection or the aforementioned
general requirements on applicable distinctiveness to shape marks
than the other traditional kinds of trademarks in EU trademark
law.34 However, the lack of a methodological structure on how to
implement the equality approach for product shapes or packaging,
as registrable trademarks, in either TMD or EUTMR, paved the
way for EU courts to fill this gap in their case law.35 In practice,
the “equal treatment” that CJEU invariably cites in its case law
will prevent courts from applying any additional requirements
that may distort shape marks’ distinctiveness test from its general legal definition.36 To put it differently, the innate characteristics of product shapes or packaging, as protectable trademarks,
and also their weak capacity in establishing inherent distinctiveness, should not be considered as a basis to limit the scope of

See infra Part IV.
31 Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 48; Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, Freixenet v.
Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2011 E.C.R. I-10205, ¶ 42; Case
C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal
Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 29.
32 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer
Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 7(b).
33 Case C-64/02, Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. v. Erpo Möbelwerk GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031, ¶ 24.
34 Case C-299/99, ¶ 49; Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG v.
Winward Indus. Inc., 2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 42.
35 See, e.g., Case C-218/01, ¶ 39.
36 See, e.g., Case C-404/02, Nichols plc v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2004
E.C.R. I-08499, ¶ 26 (for an example of said requirements).
30
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protection or to expand their protection requirements, particularly, in terms of distinctiveness criterion.37
From a fundamental viewpoint, when it comes to trademark
protection of product trade dress and packaging, comparable
equality is adopted in U.S. trademark law.38 At the federal level,
through a teleological interpretation of the terms “symbols” or
“device” in the Act, the U.S. Senate, in its Report for the 1988
amendments, declared that shapes, color, product configuration,
and packaging should not be excluded from the definition of trademarks when they can perform the functions of a trademark.39
This notion is reflected in the Supreme Court’s case law.40 In Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,41 the Court held that “[p]rotection
of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the Act’s purpose to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among
competing producers.”42 It also added the shared function and
rational of trade dress marks should be regarded as a basis for
providing equal legal treatment.43 The Court concreted its findings of equal treatment stating that “trademarks and trade dress
under § 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose of preventing
deception and unfair competition;” therefore, “[t]here is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to” those entities.44
Besides, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, the Court found that
“almost anything [which] ... is capable of carrying meaning”45 could
be regarded as trademark, and “[i]t is the source-distinguishing
ability of a mark not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance,
word, or sign that permits it to serve these basic purposes.”46

Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, ¶ 68.
38 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, supra note 23, at 5.
39 Id. at 44.
40 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).
41 Id. at 763, 764 n.1.
42 Id. at 774 (internal quotations omitted).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 773.
45 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (finding that
“[s]ince human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all
that is capable of carrying meaning this language read literally is not restrictive”).
46 Id. at 164.
37
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Nonetheless, despite the shared equality approach toward
product shapes and packaging, both EU and U.S. trademark law
show a divergence from the equality principle when it comes to
putting that principle into practice.47 In actuality, this divergence
has reached a point at which one can call equal treatment with
shape marks a quasi-equality one in the EU and a mere duality
in U.S. trademark law.48 In terms of distinctiveness, specifically,
the deviation from the equality approach in both U.S. and EU
trademark law began with this argument that the evaluation of
shape marks’ distinctiveness has its own kind of complexity
compared to traditional trademarks, particularly word marks.49
This complexity or difficulty, in its EU sense,50 was developed in
EU and U.S. jurisdictions with two basic presumptions, which
were two sides of the same coin.51 First, people ordinarily perceive
visual attributes of goods as ornamental or technical features;52
therefore, product shapes and packaging have limited capacity in
transmitting commercial information to the relevant consumers.53
Those assumptions convinced the courts in the EU and United
States to develop a tailored test that may not be compatible with
the standard definition of distinctiveness, as well as the preliminary principle of equal treatment.54
In the course of divergence from the equality approach, the
EUTMR and Directive have imposed more restrictive requirements
on the protection of shape marks compared to other conventional
trademarks.55 The Directive’s Article 7(1)(b), (d), (e) and Article

Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 30; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000).
48 The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 656 (noting that “assimilationists properly attribute to product design trade dress protection the same
positive values as are assigned to trademark protection of words, and thus
accord shapes equivalent protection as source-identifiers. But this model fails
to acknowledge the important differences between words and shapes”).
49 Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 30; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 215.
50 Case C-445/13, Voss of Nor. ASA v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal
Mkt., ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 91.
51 Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 30; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 215.
52 Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Analysis
of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1073–74 (2009).
53 Id. at 1074.
54 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 213; Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 30.
55 See Council Regulation 2017/1001, supra note 15, at art. 7, 8–9.
47
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4(1)(c), (d) of EUTMR regulate: “signs which consist exclusively of
(i) the shape, or another characteristic, which results from the nature of the goods themselves; (ii) the shape, or another characteristic, of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result; (iii) the
shape, or another characteristic, which gives substantial value to
the goods;” are considered as “devoid of any distinctive character.”56
In terms of shape marks’ distinctiveness, the equality approach was challenged by two substantial elements, namely different public perception of product shapes or packaging and the
shape marks’ weak capability in constituting the required distinctiveness.57 Regarding the public perception, in its settled case
law the CJEU invariably has presumed that consumers are not in
the habit of perceiving the identifying information from a color per
se, shape, or container.58 As a normative presumption to correct
the factual circumstances, the CJEU demarcated a bright line between the applicable methods for shape marks’ distinctiveness and
traditional trademarks, like word and figurative marks.59 As the
CJEU has clearly found in Linde AG, the equal treatment principle
does not mean that the public perception of shape marks is just like
the mechanism by which the relevant public may receive and perceive the identifying information via word marks.60 Therefore,
shape marks should “remain subject to a multifaceted examination
of whether they are eligible to be registered as trademarks.”61
A review of the practical instructions in OHIM (EUIPO)
reinforces this argument that distinctiveness ground is the first
selection for examiners to implement a restrictive approach to the

Id. at art. 7(1)(b), (e).
57 See Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 49; Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 31; Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche
SiSi-Werke v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2006 E.C.R. I568, ¶ 31; Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux Merkenbureau, 2003
E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 52; Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, 2004
E.C.R. I-6152, ¶ 39; Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Dev Saie Gangjee, The Image of
the Consumer in European Trade Mark Law, in THE IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN
EU LAW 18 (Dorota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2018).
58 Case C-218/01, ¶ 49; Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 31; Case C-173/04 P, ¶ 31; Case
C-104/01, ¶ 52; Case C-49/02, ¶ 39.
59 Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 18.
60 Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG v. Winward Indus. Inc., 2002
E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 48.
61 Id. ¶ 27.
56
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shape marks’ registrability.62 To be more clear, despite the freedom
of choice in selecting the refusal grounds, and also the CJEU
findings in Remington,63 and Linde,64 on the priority of functionality for refusal, the examiners prefer to “examine shape mark
by ruling out a priori and, as such, the application of” other refusal grounds, particularly functionality.65 The reason behind prioritizing the distinctiveness ground is admittedly related to its
large capacity for interpretation comparing to functionality ground
with a more challenging process of weighing the competitive repercussions.66 The CJEU’s deviation from the equal treatment
approach culminated in “depart significantly criterion” as the second part of the applicable method to determine whether product
packaging and product shapes may overcome the noninherent
distinctiveness obstacle to be qualified enough for registration.67
According to this test, “a trademark which significantly departs
from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfills its
essential function is not devoid of [any] distinctive character.”68
As a fundamental divergence from the equality approach, the
empirical presumption about public perception of product shapes
and packaging, and the “depart significantly criterion” have
weakened the shape marks’ chance for registration and make it
difficult—but not impossible—to establish distinctiveness compared to other protectable trademarks.69

Some commentators also support this view arguing that priority of distinctiveness provision will shift shape mark through a right path. See, e.g.,
Joachim Bornkamm, Harmonizing Trade Mark Law in Europe: The Stephen
Stewart Memorial, Lecture, 1999 INTELL. PROP. Q. 283, 290 (stating that “lack of
distinctiveness seems preferable, because trademark protection remains available for the shape if it acquires distinctiveness by use”).
63 Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer
Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 48.
64 Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, ¶ 42.
65 Cesar J. Ramírez-Montes, The Elusive Distinctiveness of Trade Dress in
EU Trademark Law, 34 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277, 300 (2020).
66 Jean-Christophe Troussel & Peter van den Broecke, Is European Community Trademark Law Getting in Good Shape?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1066,
1072 (2003); Bornkamm, supra note 62, at 290.
67 Bornkamm, supra note 62, at 290.
68 Ilanah Fhima, The Public Interest in European Trade Mark Law, 2017
INTELL. PROP. Q. 311, 318 (2017).
69 Id.
62
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On the other hand, in U.S. trademark law, the divergence
from equal treatment has mainly emanated from the process of
engrafting the trade dress protection, as a competition matter, into
trademark law.70 In this view, commercial use of the others’ products’ unregistered visual attributes is merely a competition cause
of action, which does not comprise the essentials of trademark
protection.71 Nonetheless, when it came to confer trademark
protection to trade dress marks, U.S. trademark law had to articulate a new framework for a novel kind of trademarks, which
entailed going beyond the equal treatment principle.72 To develop
that new framework U.S. trademark law has been under the
influence of similar premises that EU trademark law contemplates in making the protection of shape marks more restrictive.73 The U.S. courts, like EU courts, presumed that “product
design almost invariably serves purposes other than source identification,”74 which means ordinary consumers take the goods’ visual
features as aesthetic or technical traits.75 Indeed, the competition background of trade dress protection made it a complicated
concept, which caused a disagreement among U.S. courts concerning the appropriate test for distinctiveness examination.76 Hence,
trade dress marks are protected with a duality in treatment and
with more restrictive requirements.77 The signs of that dual
treatment could be found in the federal regulations.78 According
to Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, “the substantive
rules applicable to the protection of product designs differ in some

See, e.g., STEPHEN F. MOHR ET AL., U.S. TRADE DRESS LAW: EXPLORING
THE BOUNDARIES 11 (Int’l Trademark Ass’n eds., 1997).
71 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:1 (5th ed. 2021).
72 See Rudolph Rayle, The Trend Towards Enhancing Trademark Owners’
Rights—A Comparative Study of U.S. and German Trademark Law, 7 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 229 (2000) (“U.S. trademark law shows a clear trend
towards enhancing owner’s rights in deviation from the traditional purposes
for trademark protection.”).
73 See id.
74 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
75 Id. at 212.
76 Theodore H. Davis & Jordan S. Weinstein, The Sixty-Second Year of Administration of the U.S. Trademark (Lanham Act) of 1946, 100 TRADEMARK
REP. 88, 100–02 (2010).
77 Rayle, supra note 72, at 229.
78 Id.
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respects from those applicable to packaging and related subject
matter.”79 Technically speaking, the duality in distinctiveness
examination springs from the idea of whether the distinctiveness
of trade dress marks could be detected based on the traditional
tests or not.80 This problem left the U.S. courts always hesitant
between applying the traditional test (Abercrombie spectrum),
which is calibrated to be used for verbal marks,81 and employing
the ontological tests, which are developed based on the inherent
characteristics of product shapes, designs, or packaging.82
II.THE SHAPE MARKS DISTINCTIVENESS;
THE COMPLEXITY OF METHODOLOGY
The openness of EU and U.S. trademark law on conferring
trademark protection to product shape, design, and packaging
proves that the courts, legislatures, and policymakers in those
jurisdictions have understood the info-commercial efficiency of
visual attributes of products for transmitting the commercial
information.83 Indeed, they know that “unlike a word mark or a

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 16 cmt. a (AM. L. INST.
1993).
80 See Rayle, supra note 72, at 229.
81 See Chad M. Smith, Undressing Abercrombie: Defining When Trade Dress
Is Inherently Distinctive, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 160, 168 (1997) (“As the Court
found no reason to treat trade dress symbols different from verbal symbols, it
applied the same rule to both.”).
82 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the
source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color,
shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve these basic purposes.”).
83 Sandra Moriarty, Visual Communication as a Primary System, 14 J. VISUAL
LITERACY 11, 20 (1994) (observing that “visual communication is as much a
primary system as verbal language, and that language based communication
has been inappropriately privileged in contemporary western culture”); see
also Annika Olsson & Andreas C. Larsson, Value Creation in PSS Design
Through Product and Packaging Innovation Process, in INTRODUCTION TO
PRODUCT/SERVICE SYSTEM DESIGN 93, 100 (Tomohiko Sakao & Mattias Lindahl
eds., 2009).
[I]n the business to consumers domain the package is the interface of the product to the consumers and must be considered
as the integrated part of product. The integrated product and
package system ... can help to communicate with user what
kind of outcome they can expect from using a product or service.
Id.
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device, a mere shape can communicate further information only
with difficulty.”84 In the modern market within which the consumers are becoming more visual and less lexical,85 product shapes,
designs, and other goods’ visual signs can effectively meet the
fundamental objectives for which the trademark system is devised.86 As a matter of fact, in an informational context, every
single visual element of a product could potentially function as a
medium to convey commercial meanings, which cannot simply
be expressed by words.87 In our modern detextualized societies, this
feature will provide producers, with an effective instrument to develop a new and concrete vehicle to communicate with the relevant
consumers.88 Protection of the goods’ source-identifying visual
attributes may incentivize producers to endeavor more into developing a new platform to communicate commercial information in the
market contexts with less informational capacity for verbal signs.89
As a matter of principle, in an integral and efficient
trademark system, a sign should be intact enough to guarantee
the efficiency and integrity of the system.90 To be considered as
an intact instrument, and simultaneously, as a legally protectable one, a trademark should be capable of performing the role of
being distinctive.91 However, what makes the question of shape
marks’ distinctiveness special in EU and U.S. trademark law is
uncertainty about how product shapes and designs may communicate information.92 The problem will become more enigmatic

In re Bongrain SA [2003] EWHC (Ch) 531 [13] (Eng.).
The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 615 (stating that “our semiotic
senses are in state of tumult. Society is becoming more visual and less lexical”).
86 Aoki, supra note 1, at 526.
87 Id.
88 The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 641 (observing that “[i]n our
culture a wide range of things are doing what verbal trademarks were originally meant to do. This is facet of the detextualization of society, and the
cause of a third convergence concern”).
89 Graeme Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of
Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 483 (1997) [hereinafter
Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness].
90 Barton Beebe, The semiotic account of trademark doctrine and trademark culture, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 42, 48 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
91 See Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1283, 1317 (2011).
92 See Harmonization of Trademark Law, supra note 28, at 164 (stating that
“[u]ntil now, the assertations concerning the way in which ‘unconventional’
84
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when it is realized that unlike word marks, which enjoy language
to communicate commercial information, visual signs, do not take
advantage of any contractual, and definitive source of meanings
to predict the semantic content of commercial information.93
That characteristic of shape marks makes them extremely interpretative, and inherently hard to be examined in terms of distinctiveness.94 As Professor Moriarty observes,
[i]n terms of complexity, visual interpretation can be seen as being
more complex than verbal interpretation, primarily because of
the lack of a conventionalized sign system and a formalized training protocol .... [V]isual communication is neither derivative,
nor peripheral to language, and therefore the designation of
“secondary,” “tertiary” or a “superstructure” built on language
is inappropriate.95

For the U.S. and EU trademark system, within which the
examiners, courts and legislatures were accustomed to examining
the “distinctiveness character” of word marks, mainly based on a
lingual system, the shape marks’ “indefinite nature” could cause
fundamental questions.96 In practice, this problem concerning the
shape marks’ distinctiveness will put legal systems in a quandary
of choosing between language-based and visual-based tests.97
According to both of those tests, the distinctiveness is supposed
to be examined based on the interactive relationship between

forms of signs are perceived by consumers have not been underpinned by
empirical evidence”).
93 Case T-230/05, Golf USA, Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal
Mkt., ¶ 21 (Mar. 6, 2007), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document
.jsf;jsessionid=7C0171D8D66ED51C25AD1DD4A38A7E99?text=&docid=6178
5&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6747872
[https://perma.cc/YS3M-RNFK]; Case T-289/02, Telepharmacy Sols. Inc. v. Off.
For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. II-2856, ¶ 24.
94 Roland Barthes, The Rhetoric of the Image, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 38–
39 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (“All images are polysemous; they imply,
underlying their signifiers, a ‘floating chain’ of signifieds, and the reader able
to choose some and ignore others. Polysemy poses a question of meaning and
this question always come through as a dysfunction.”).
95 Moriarty, supra note 83, at 20.
96 See Brian M.Z. Reece, Distinctiveness of Marks Suffering Genocide: A
Survey of Genocide Cases, 47 AIPLA Q.J. 485, 501 (2019).
97 See Mark P. McKenna, Teaching Trademark Theory through the Lens of
Distinctiveness, 52 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 843, 848–49 (2008).
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consumers’ perception and indicative features of a sign.98 However, those tests are different in terms of the sources from which
the indicative meanings come.99 In language-based tests, having
access to dictionaries could provide conclusive information regarding the information that relevant consumers may perceive.100 Nonetheless, concerning the product shapes or packaging, there is no
such contractual source to predict the perceived message.101 In the
U.S. trademark law, that quandary in employing traditional language-based and visual-based tests has led to categorizing the
protectable trademarks into two separate categories.102 On one
side, service trade dress and packaging, with the capability of providing inherent distinctiveness, and product shapes or designs
with the requirement of showing secondary meaning, on the other
side.103 Meanwhile, in EU trademark law, the CJEU in Henkel
Perwoll Bottle showed its willingness to recognize the inherent
capability of shape marks to establish distinctiveness without
banning the possibility of showing acquired distinctiveness.104
A. The EU “Significant Departure Criterion” and U.S.
“Ontological Tests”; Different in Titles, Similar in Contents
1. The EU “Significant Departure” Test
More than a decade ago, accepting that the criteria for examining the shape marks’ distinctiveness are no different from
those applicable to other trademarks, the CJEU in Mag Instrument
Inc. held that “[a]verage consumers are not in the habit of making
assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of their

Id. at 847–48.
99 See Robert Unikel, Better by Design: The Availability of Trade Dress
Protection for Product Design and the Demise of Aesthetic Functionality, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 312, 335 (1995).
100 McKenna, supra note 97, at 848 (stating that “it is relatively easy for
courts to determine whether and how those meanings relate to the products
or services with which they are used. But product design and packaging features
rarely have such generally understood meanings, and as a result, the traditional framework is less helpful.”).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 848–49.
103 Id.
104 See Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 30.
98
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shape or the shape of their packaging in the absence of any
graphic or word element and it could therefore prove more difficult to establish.”105
By the same token, the court continued arguing that “the
more closely the shape for which registration is sought resembles the shape most likely to be taken by the product in question, the greater the likelihood of the shape being devoid of any
distinctive character.”106 Through the same empirical presumption, the CJEU in Henkel Perwoll Bottle ruled that the “relevant
consumers are accustomed to seeing shapes similar to those at
issue, in a wide variety of designs, it is to be observed that such
shapes appear as variants of one of those common shapes rather
than as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods.”107
Therefore, “only a mark which departs significantly from the norm
or customs of the sector and thereby fulfills it essential function
of indicating origin, is not devoid of any distinctive character for
the purposes of that provision.”108
As mentioned earlier, the indefinite nature of visual elements
makes their meaning always dependent on the consumers’ perception, as the decisive gauge to determine the communicated message.109 Due to that inherent characteristic of ocular elements,
the shape marks’ distinctiveness in EU trademark law is examined,
initially, by reference to the elements of the trademark in question
and, simultaneously, by reference to the targeted public.110 According to that principle, the CJEU in the “significant departure
criterion” has striven to implement this value by developing an
exhaustive framework in which a normative rule is combined
with an empirical presumption.111 Accordingly, the relevant consumer with no predisposition will not presumably perceive the
significantly departed visual elements of a shape or design as a

See Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in
the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 29.
106 See id. ¶ 31.
107 See Case T-393/02, Henkel KGaA v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. II-4117, ¶ 21.
108 See Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 29.
109 See McKenna, supra note 97, at 849.
110 See Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 29; Case T-305/02, Nestlé Waters France v. Off.
For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2003 E.C.R. II-5209, ¶ 22.
111 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 13.
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source indicator.112 As a two-step test, the outcome of the examination will not be legally reliable “without referring to the perception
of the average consumer.”113 Therefore, the registration is provided
to verifying that it “fulfils its essential function, namely that of
guaranteeing the origin of the product.”114 In this view, the CJEU
defines the average consumer as one “even without conducting an
analytical or comparative examination and without paying particular attention” will comprehend a shape mark as a distinctive
trademark.115 The compound nature of the test and its application in the subsequent cases have convinced some commentators
to believe that significant departure from the norms or customs is
not only sufficient but also necessary for the purpose of overcoming the dilemma of inherent distinctiveness of shape marks.116
Furthermore, putting consumers’ perception at the center of the
question of distinctiveness will pave the CJEU’s way to circumvent the risk of assimilation of the distinctiveness criterion with
provisions of the other provinces of intellectual property, especially
the individual character under design law.117 In this perspective,
the reference point in distinctiveness assessment will be shifted
from the prior art to the commercial environment in which a shape
mark is supposed to act as a trademark.118 Additionally, this binary
model will prevent leaving design law as a useless legal entity by

Id.
See Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 51.
114 Id.
115 Id. ¶ 45.
116 Guy Tritton, Distinctiveness and Acquired Distinctiveness: The Approach
and Territorial Aspects, 13 ERA F. 227, 230 (2012).
117 See STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING, supra note 5, at 71, casting
doubt on how the CJEU may implement this objective into practice. In this
concern, it states that “it is unclear whether and how the criteria for appraising inherent distinctiveness of a shape mark are distinguished from the criterion of ‘individual character’ under design law, and whether the distinction is
one of grade or of substance.” Id.
118 Some commentators have criticized this idea. See, e.g., Annette Kur,
Too Common, Too Splendid, or ‘Just Right’? Trade Mark Protection for Product
Shapes in the Light of CJEU Case Law, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION Res. Paper No. 14-17, 26 (2014) [hereinafter Too Splendid]
(arguing that the significant departure is “rather suitable for protecting creative achievements than for testing the ability of a sign to function as a mark”).
112
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incentivizing producers to protect their designs under the perpetual monopoly that trademark law may provide.119
Nonetheless, even though the “significant departure criterion” puts consumers’ perception at the center of the question of
shape marks’ distinctiveness, the element of comparison with other
shapes or designs in the relevant sector will amount to observing
the protectable shape marks merely as product or service distinguishers rather than source-identifiers.120 In EU trademark law, a
trademark to possess distinctive character should serve to identify
the commercial source from which a good or service has originated
as well as to distinguish them from others in the market.121 Accordingly, as a twofold definition, for being distinctive, both the
ability to distinguish and the capacity of identifying are inevitable elements that could not be used interchangeably.122 Hence, in
the case of shape marks, there should be no logical correlation between being significantly departed from the common designs in
the sector (distinguishability) and being capable of identifying the
commercial origin.123 To put it differently, the more significantly a
design departs from the common designs in the sector the more
effectively it proves its competency to be distinguished among
the other comparable ones but not its source-identifying capacity.124
That shift in the function of a shape mark within the significant
departure model springs from the test’s great value on the impression that a design may arouse in the relevant consumers to
distinguish a design or shape among other common ones in the
sector rather than the effect that may cause them to realize the

See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 14.
120 See id. at 13.
121 Id.
122 See Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 30; Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, Freixenet v.
Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2011 E.C.R. I-10205, ¶ 42; Case
C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal
Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 29; Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. Ballantine &
Son, Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6244, ¶¶ 22, 24; Case C-39/97, Canon v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 1998 E.C.R. I-5525, ¶ 28.
123 See Case C-218/01, ¶ 30; Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, ¶ 42;
Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 29; Case C-349/95, ¶¶ 22, 24; Case C-39/97, ¶ 28.
124 See Case C-218/01, ¶ 30; Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, ¶ 42;
Case C-136/02 P, ¶ 29; Case C-349/95, ¶¶ 22, 24; Case C-39/97, ¶ 28.
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indicated origin.125 Another threat of focusing on the element of
distinguishability is the conceptual overlap between distinctive and
nondistinctive designs that significantly depart from the standard
designs in the sector.126 Indeed, the significant departure criterion
has not determined how courts or examiners could assess distinctiveness in the case of shape marks that notwithstanding significant divergence from the usual forms in the relevant field have
not been found by consumers as a distinctive source-identifier.127
2. The U.S. “Ontological Tests”
On the other side of this comparison, a similar approach
is followed by U.S. courts in examining the existence of inherent
distinctiveness merely for product packaging.128 Indeed, unlike
the EU equality treatment towards different kinds of shape marks,
in U.S. trademark law, the historical split over lower courts regarding the applicability of categorical test (Abercrombie spectrum)
for trade dress marks made the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores
v. Samara Bros. convinced to divide the protectable trade dress
marks into two separate categories in terms of the required type of
distinctiveness.129 In this case, the Court held that unlike products’
shape and designs, product packaging could “almost automatically tell a consumer that they refer to a brand.”130 The Court also
affirmed the Court’s normative presumption in Qualitex Co. on
consumers’ predisposition and producers’ subjective aim to employ
word marks and product packaging as source-identifiers.131 It

Tom W. Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very Real Problem, 56 MD. L. REV.
384, 413 (1997).
126 See Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness, supra note 89, at 582.
127 Roland Knaak et al., Study on the Overall Functioning of the European
Trade Mark System, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
Res. Paper No. 12-13, 52 (2011); see also Sara Balice, Tripp Trapp Case: The
Court of Justice on 3D Trademarks, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 807, 812 (2015).
128 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2000).
129 Id. at 211.
130 Id. at 212 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
163 (1995)).
131 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 209–10; A. Samuel Oddi, Product
Simulation: From Tort to Intellectual Property, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 149–
50 (1998); see also Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d
373, 378–79 (2d Cir. 1997); The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 545–49
125
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reinforced this empirical presumption, stating that unlike product
shapes or designs, product packaging will “immediately ... signal a
brand or a product source.”132 Accordingly, to be eligible as a trademark, product shapes and designs are subject to proof of secondary
meaning.133 Therefore, by way of comparison with the “significant
departure” test, in U.S. trademark law, the empirical presumption
of consumer’s predisposition has been reversed in the case of product packaging.134 In other words, courts or examiners should
assume that relevant consumers are in the habit of taking the
visual elements of a product packaging as a source-identifier.135
Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s distinction between
product shapes or designs and product packaging, the way was
left open to courts to employ former ontological tests in the case
of product packaging.136 As a matter of law, the ontological tests,
which were initially designed for all kinds of trade dress marks,
could now employ only for product packaging.137 The courts with
an ontological approach contemplate the legal nature of trade
dress marks as a related, concurrently, as an independent entity
concerning the trademark system.138 In this view, the mechanism of distinctiveness assessment is designed as a two-step test,
just like what is ruled by CJEU in the “significant departure
test.”139 Accordingly, the distinctive character should be examined
based on the relationship between the visual qualifications that
a mark comprises and what the relevant consumers may percept.140 In Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros, the Supreme Court
found that the ontological tests “would rarely provide the basis
for summary disposition of an anticompetitive strike suit” in product shapes distinctiveness.141 However, this test has remained

(criticizing that using producers’ intention as a basis for justifying the inherent
distinctiveness for product packaging will give rise to self-serving testimony).
132 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163.
133 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212–13, 216.
134 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 13.
135 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212–13, 216.
136 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
137 The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 618.
138 Id.
139 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 13.
140 Id.
141 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13, 216
(2000).
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still applicable concerning product packaging.142 Recently in In re
Forney Industries, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, supported the ability of product packaging to establish
inherent distinctiveness.143 The court also emphasized that any
distinctiveness assessment of a product packaging should be implemented based on the lines that have already been provided
under the Seabrook test, as a suitable ontological one.144 It finally
concluded that, “[i]n determining the inherent distinctiveness of
a trade dress, the question ... is whether the trade dress makes
such an impression on consumers that they will assume the
trade dress is associated with a particular source.”
In U.S. trademark law, the Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. BarWell Foods, Ltd. is the most prominent case with the ontological
approach that is mostly known for developing an objective test
for trade dress marks.145 In this case, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA) developed a two-fold test that just like
what CJEU articulated in Henkel Perwoll Bottle was accorded
based on the interaction between public view and the visual
characteristics of the shape or design at issue.146 For that purpose, it confined the determination of distinctiveness into four
main factors: (i) whether it is “‘common’ basic shape or design,”147
(ii) whether it is “unique or unusual in a particular field,”148 (iii)
whether it is “refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known
form of ornamentation for a particular class” of the given dress,149
and finally, (iv) whether it is “capable of creating a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words.”150 By doing so,
the court took steps towards what was ruled by the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, stating that using the common

See In re Forney Indus., 955 F.3d 940, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
143 Id.
144 Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d. 1342, 1344
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
145 Samantha Primeaux, Makeup Dupes and Fair Use, 67 AM. U. L. REV.
891, 909 (2018).
146 See Forney Indus., 955 F.3d at 946; Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v.
Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 18.
147 See Seabrook Foods, Inc., 568 F. 2d. at 1344.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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features “makes it unlikely that consumers will view them as
distinctive of the goods or services of a particular seller.”151
Over time, the U.S. courts showed a considerable divergence from the Abercrombie test that was routinely applied in
the relevant cases.152 The test was developed as a consumeroriented test in which the consumers’ perception plays the role
of “relevant field” in finding the elements of “uniqueness” or “unusualness.”153 In this view, the “critical question of fact ... is
whether the public is moved in any degree to buy the article
because of its source and what are the features by which it distinguishes that source.”154 Comparing to its European counterpart, the Seabrook test like the “significant departure criterion”
has been developed based on a binary structure in which the
interaction between the degree of departure from the common
designs and fulfillment of the function of source identification plays
a central role.155 Accordingly, the more a design is unique or unusual the more it will possibly be found by consumers as an inherently distinctive trademark.156 As the court has recently
found in Days-Ease Home Products Corp., in the Seabrook test, “the
question of inherently distinctive obviously must be determined
[about] ... the reaction of purchasers to the shape, and what would
be the anticipated reaction of the average purchaser to this
shape.”157 Technically speaking, this approach is close to what
has been applied in U.S. design law to determine the “novelty” and
“non-obviousness” that may result in assimilating the “relevant
field” for trade dress distinctiveness with the role that the “prior
art” is supposed to play in design patents.158 Nonetheless, like
the European test, putting the consumer perception at the center of the question of distinctiveness assessment shifts the reference point from prior art to the commercial context in which the
relevant consumers percept a sign as an indication of origin.159

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. d (AM. L.
INST. 1993).
152 Id. § 15 cmt. b.
153 Id. § 16 cmt. a; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 1:24.
154 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917).
155 Seabrook Foods, Inc., 568 F.2d at 1344.
156 Id.
157 In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566, 568 (T.T.A.B. 1977).
158 See Too Splendid, supra note 118, at 26.
159 Id.
151
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By way of comparison with the “significant departure criterion,” similar criticisms can be made in regard to the Seabrook
test.160 In U.S. trademark law, like EU law the concept of distinctiveness is made of two fundamental elements, namely, identifyability and distinguishability.161 The Seabrook test is articulated
with emphasis on measuring the potential capacity that a design
or shape may comprise to distinguish a good or service among
other comparable ones within a particular group of them rather
than its ability to identify the source of origin.162 From a semiotic point of view, the Seabrook test, like “the significant departure
criterion” has focused on the horizontal intersign relationship that
a signifier may have with other signifiers without taking into
consideration the vertical interplay between signifier and signified.163 This approach will be fruitful in terms of assessing a signifier’s strength to be distinctive from other signifiers but not be
distinctive of the signified.164 Indeed, despite the fact that the
factors like “unusualness” or “uncommonness” may play a helpful
role in finding distinctive character could not certainly provide
us with a decisive conclusion on the lack or existence of it.165 As

160 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 197–98 (2004) (stating “[t]he Seabrook
test does, however, suffer from one conspicuous frailty. Without an overarching
test, a mere assessment of ‘uniqueness’ is irrelevant to trademark law and
unhelpful in determining distinctiveness”).
161 See MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 3:1 (stating that one of “[t]he requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a trademark [is] ... the function: to
identify and distinguish the seller’s goods from goods made or sold by others”).
According to Lanham Trademark Protection Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1127, a
mark is distinctive when it “identif[ies] and distinguish[es] [a party’s] goods ...
from those manufactured or sold by others” and “indicate[s] the source of the
goods”; see also Beebe, supra note 90, at 54.
162 Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
163 See Beebe, supra note 90, at 52–53 (observing that “[i]n brief, signification
describes the vertical, intrasign relation between signifier and signified. Value
describes the horizontal, intersign relations among signifiers, signifieds”).
164 Id. (stating that “[c]orresponding to the semiotic relation of ‘signification,’ source distinctiveness describes the extent to which a trademark’s signifier is distinctive of the signified. Corresponding to the semiotic relation of
‘value,’ differential distinctiveness describes the extent to which a trademark’s
signifier is distinctive from other signifiers in the trademark system.”).
165 The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 657 (noting that “a unique design should not be regarded as inherently distinctive merely because of its
uniqueness, although clearly that helps”).
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Unikel rightfully observes, “[c]onsumers generally purchase a
particular product for a variety of interrelated reasons ... it is thus
naive to assume that a product’s significant features and overall
design can serve only one of two polar opposite goals [i.e., esthetic
and indicative].”166
B. Steps to Add Contextualism; the U.S. Abstract Contextualism
vs. the EU Practical Steps
In 1994, after the establishment of the Seabrook test as a
milestone in the ontological approach, the Third Circuit in Duraco
Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter. Ltd. tried to pose the essentials
of the Seabrook test in a more contextualized environment.167
The court, in this case, argued in favor of the possibility of posing
inherent distinctiveness for trade dress and did alter the Seabrook’s framework.168 It also reiterated the essential elements of
the Seabrook test, like “uniqueness” and “unusualness” in the “public view.”169 However, it added new factors, namely, the “memora[bility]” and “[informed] consumers ... of all the options” to the
Seabrook test.170 The court, in this case, employs “memorability”
as a gauge in posing the question of distinctiveness in a contextual environment in which the consumer perception will pave
the way to measure the distinctiveness ex ante.171 In this concern
the court explains, to be inherently distinctive a shape or design
“must be recognizable by the consumer as an indicium of the source,

Robert Unikel, Better by Design: The Availability of Trade Dress Protection
for Product Design and the Demise of Aesthetic Functionality, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 312, 335 (1995).
167 40 F.3d 1431, 1449 (3d Cir. 1994).
168 Id.
169 Id. (The court argued “that trade dress is inherently distinctive only if
‘so unique ... in a particular market, that one can assume, without proof, that it
will automatically be perceived by customers as an indicia of origin a trademark.”
(quoting Martin P. Hoffman, Trade Dress/Product Simulation Overview, C913
A.L.I. A.B.A. 219, 222 (1994))).
170 Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d at 1450.
171 Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design Patent Rights
31 (Aug. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (stating that
“[t]he design patent distinctiveness measures of novelty and non-obviousness
are also ascertainable ex ante (even before any product reaches the hands of
a consumer) as opposed to the ex post creation of trade dress rights. In this
sense, design patents could be seen as filling the position of inherently distinctive trade dress that was eliminated in Wal-Mart”).
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rather than a decorative symbol or pattern.”172 It defined the
“memorability” as “striking or unusual in appearance, or prominently displayed on the product packaging or otherwise somehow
apt to be impressed upon minds of consumers, so that it is likely to
be actually and distinctly remembered.”173 Simultaneously, separating configurative marks from other trade dress marks, it required
that a figurative dress should be “a unique, individualized appearance so that a consumer informed of all the options available in
the market could reasonably rely on it to identify a source.”174 Using
“actually” along with “informed consumes” shows the court’s emphasis on the role of public perception in a factual context.175
Furthermore, by incorporating the factor “[informed] consumer[s] ... of all the options” it changed the legal definition of rational
consumers to concepts like “skilled person” in patent law.176
The court’s interpretation of memorability may take advantage of some scientific background in cognitive science, particularly
the top-down theory.177 According to this theory, people’s visual
perception is under the influence of the ocular characteristics of
the stimulus and the viewers’ related knowledge and experiences.178
Accordingly, there is a positive correlation between the viewers’
relevant visual experiences, the salience of the subjects’ visual
elements, and the quality of retrieval.179 However, despite those
scientific backgrounds and the complexity of the test, two fundamental questions are left unanswered in both Duraco and
Seabrook tests.180 The first question is, on which basis did the
courts in Seabrook and Duraco conclude that factors like “unusualness,” “informed consumers,” and “memorability” will pave the
way to pose the probabilistic and contextualized question of trade
dress distinctiveness predictably?181 The second question is on
which legal or empirical principle will those factors guarantee

Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d at 1449.
Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 VICKI BRUCE & PATRICK R. GREEN, VISUAL PERCEPTION: PHYSIOLOGY,
PSYCHOLOGY AND ECOLOGY 94 (1985).
178 Id.
179 Id.; NICKY HAYES, FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1994).
180 See Bell, supra note 125, at 403–06, 413.
181 Id. at 403–06.
172
173

98 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:071
the objectives of distinctiveness in its legal terminology?182 In other
words, are the Seabrook and Duraco tests capable enough to determine the point at which the subjective perception of an ordinary
consumer meets the objective message that a shape or design
signifies?183 In response to those questions, it seems the courts have
ignored the fact that there are numerous influential, meanwhile
immeasurable factors other than the abovementioned factors that
may impact the consumers’ perception in their trademark-oriented
purchases.184 Hence, consumers’ reaction in a market context is
the decisive source upon which one can find out whether consumers
have understood a shape or design as a source-identifying sign or
merely a technical or ornamental feature.185 Those sorts of questions have convinced some commentators to argue that irrespective of the factual capability of shape marks to be inherently
distinctive, the ontological approach will not add any practical
solution to the dilemma of trade dress distinctiveness.186
Some European commentators raise similar concerns regarding the mechanism of implementing the “significant departure
test” in a contextual environment.187 Some of them even warn
about the risk of shifting towards abstraction.188 Some also find the
criterion’s assumption regarding the consumers’ habit somehow

Id. at 413.
Id. at 412 (arguing that a distinctive trademark should be able to indicate the “subjective impressions that [a design] arouses in each observer and
the objective, external thing to which it refers” (emphasis added)).
184 Id. at 391.
185 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhibit Symbols, So Should
We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing The Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity,
20 COLUM.-VLA. J. L. & ARTS 123, 125, 130–31 (1996) (noting that designs have
served a dual property of decorating and source identifying. Dreyfuss observes
that in a purchasing context determining that consumers employ what kind
of those properties is a contextualized matter.).
186 Lars Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade
Dress Conundrum, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 243, 302 (2005) (stating that “[t]his
element does not appear to add much of anything to the analysis because if
consumers cannot remember the mark, it obviously fails to identify and distinguish the source of the goods”); see Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness,
supra note 89, at 536 (stating that “[t]he ‘memorable’ nature of the feature
would not appear to add very much to the analysis in predicting whether a
shape or feature is likely to operate as a source identifier with consumers it
surely is relevant that the shape is likely to register with the consumer”).
187 See Fhima, supra note 68, at 318.
188 Id.
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arbitrary without a concrete evidentiary basis.189 On the other
hand, some commentators believe the test’s combination of empirical and normative rules provides a platform to pose distinctiveness
in more contextual analysis.190 That group of scholars believes
there is a constructive interplay between what is protected by
law and the commercial message that people may extract from a
sign.191 However, regardless of the contradictory doctrinal analyses, a review of the relevant precedent in EU trademark law,
particularly after Henkel Perwoll Bottle, shows that the EU courts
have noticed this flaw in the system.192 The EU courts have continually been facing the question of whether the “significant
departure test” reflects the market realities sufficiently or not.193
In this regard, unlike the U.S. courts’ ontological approach, the
EU courts have understood that there are undoubtedly some
other involving factors like the period of using a mark, and market practices that may impact empirical presumptions about the
consumers’ behavior in the relevant sector.194 They have also
realized that mere emphasis on the normative assumption regarding the consumer predisposition may cause trademark law
to diverge from the commercial realities that influence consumers’ economic preferences in the market.195 On this account, not
any significant departure from the common designs in the relevant sector will conclusively mean that a visual feature of a
product is inherently distinctive.196 In other words, as a matter
of principle, the applicability of normative tests is dependent on
their compatibility with the external realities in the relevant

Robert Burrell & Huw Beverly-Smith, Shaving the Trade Marks Directive Down to Size?, 4 MOD. L. REV. 570, 579 (2000); see also Harmonization
of Trademark Law, supra note 28, at 164.
190 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 35.
191 Robert Burrell & Michael Handler, Making Sense of Trade Mark Law,
INTELL. PROP. Q. 388, 399 (2003).
192 Ramírez-Montes, supra note 65, at 280–81.
193 Case C-521/13 P, Think Schuhwerk GmbH v. Off. For Harmonisation in
the Internal Mkt., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2222, ¶ 49 (Sep. 11, 2014); Joined Cases T359/12 & T-360/12, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Off. For Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt., ECLI:EU:T:2015:215, ¶ 23 (Apr. 21, 2015); see Ramírez-Montes,
supra note 65, at 318 n.250 (discussing Case T-376/10, V. Fraas GmbH v. Off.
For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., ECLI:EU:2012:185 (Sept. 19, 2012)).
194 See Ramírez-Montes, supra note 65, at 315–20.
195 See The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 644.
196 Id. at 646.
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market.197 In Libertel, the CJEU expressly reflects this factual
point holding that in the case of shape marks distinctiveness,
“the regard must be had both to the ordinary use of trademarks
as a badge of origin in the sectors concerned and to the perception of the relevant public.”198 This background made the EU
courts conclude that any distinctiveness assessment will be a
flawed inquiry without a market appraisal.199
Furthermore, the market appraisal is fundamental in defining the relevant norms and customs in the relevant sector.200
In Develey Holding GmbH., the CJEU affirmed that in finding
distinctive character the Board “may base its analysis on facts
arising from practical experience generally acquired from the
marketing of general consumer goods the claim that in finding
what will guide consumers to make their choice.”201 It also supported the Court of First Instance’s finding that regarding the mark
at issue (bottle shape packaging) “[t]he use of a shape as an indication of the origin of a product has more importance, because
consumers make a preliminary choice on the basis of the shape of
the packaging and only thereafter study the label.”202 The CJEU’s
fact-based proceedings show the courts’ propensity to take a transformative attitude according to the nature of the case.203 For
instance, in Enercon GmbH,204 the CJEU reversed what it had
already ruled in Develey Holding concerning the consumers’

Id. at 657–59.
Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux Merkenbureau, 2003
E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 62.
199 See id.; Jennifer Davis, Revisiting the Average Consumer: An Uncertain
Presence in European Trademark Law, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 15, 18 (2015) (stating that “the views of the average consumer cannot be taken for granted by
registering authorities or the courts but must be ascertained through the
collection of empirical data”); see also Case T-358/04, George Neumann GmbH v.
Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2007 E.C.R. II-03329, ¶ 46; Case
T-194/01, Unilever NV v. Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2003
E.C.R. II-00383, ¶ 48; Case T-129/04, Develey Holding GmbH v. Off. for
Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2006 E.C.R. II-813, ¶ 47; Case C-238/06
P, Develey Holding GmbH v. Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt.,
2007 E.C.R. I-9379, ¶ 26.
200 See Case T-129/04, ¶ 47; Case C-238/06 P, ¶ 92.
201 Case C-238/06 P, ¶ 26.
202 Id. ¶ 92.
203 See Case C-20/08 P, Enercon GmbH v. Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2008 E.C.R. I-179, ¶ 44.
204 See id.
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behavior in using label and packaging in the case of bottle
shapes.205 In Enercon, the mark in question was an outer casing
of the nacelle of a wind turbine that the applicant sought to register as a three-dimensional CTM.206 The applicant claimed that
the shape of the product has departed significantly from the
comparable available shapes in the sector.207 On appeal, the
CJEU supported the Board’s refusal decision stating that the
proof of significant departure from the customary or common
designs in the sector is not enough to establish inherent distinctiveness.208 Regarding the subject at issue, it argued that in the
case of wind energy converters, what guides the relevant consumers
to make choice is not the shape of the product.209 Subtracting from
the market practices, it found that the relevant consumers invest
in purchasing wind turbines looking at the word marks rather
than the shape of goods, which provide them with more accurate
information about the origin of the product.210
The market appraisal has not been limited to the elements
that influence the consumers’ perception in the market.211 In
Deutsche SiSi-Werke,212 the CJEU strived to recalibrate the concept
of the “relevant sector” in the “significant departure criterion”
through a contextual approach.213 In this case, the applicant sought
to register shapes of various stand-up pouches for packaging
drinks.214 The Court of First Instance had already found that in
the European market, “fruit drinks and fruit juices are packaged
solely in glass bottles or in cartons” and there is no evidence of
using stand-up pouches for fruit juices.215 The CJEU on appeal
ruled that in the process of comparison with other available
shapes or designs, there is no systematic necessity to restrict the
relevant sector to actual goods in respect of which the registration is

Case C-238/06 P, ¶ 46.
206 Case C-20/08 P, ¶¶ 6–7.
207 Id. ¶ 7.
208 Id. ¶ 25.
209 Id. ¶ 17.
210 Id. ¶ 49.
211 See Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v. Off. For Harmonisation
in the Internal Mkt., 2006 E.C.R. I-568, ¶ 44.
212 Id.
213 See id.
214 Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
215 Id. ¶ 18.
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sought.216 It continued affirming that the consumers’ perception
might be influenced by marketing methods used for other goods.217
Therefore, “depending on the nature of the goods in question and
the trade mark applied for, it may be necessary, for the purposes
of assessing whether or not the trade mark is devoid of any distinctive character, to take into consideration a wider sector.”218
Adding that investigative approach to the normative framework
will likely respond to the critiques that blame EU trademark law
for treating average consumers generally as presumable agents
rather than interrogated ones.219 Additionally, it will pave the way
to pose the question of shape marks’ distinctiveness in a market-led
analysis under which the market is the closing scale for distinctiveness measurement.220 Nonetheless, even though those factual
investigations are helpful to neutralize the threat of abstraction,
the endless number of facts and the unique nature of each case
entail a substantial amount of time and costs.221 Furthermore,
the growing number of CJEU’s case law with a fact-oriented
approach may dilute the necessity of the significant departure,
as the normative part of the test.222
III.THE IMPACT OF WORD MARKS’ DISTINCTIVENESS
A. The CJEU’s Use of Word Marks’ Distinctiveness as a
Supplemental Tool
In 2004, shortly after Henkel Perwoll Bottle, a case with a
similar subject was referred to CJEU.223 In this case, namely,
Procter & Gamble Co. (Dishwashing tablets),224 the appellant filed

Id. ¶ 32.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See Jennifer Davis, Locating the Average Consumer: His Judicial Origins,
Intellectual Influences, and Current Role in European Trademark Law, 2 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 183, 185 (2005).
220 Jennifer Davis, A European Constitution for IPRS? Competition, Trademarks, and Culturally Significant Signs, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1005,
1022 (2004).
221 See Ramírez-Montes, supra note 65, at 315.
222 See id.
223 Joined Cases C-468/01 P to C-472/01 P, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Off.
for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-5092, ¶ 44.
224 Id.
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an appeal against the judgments of the Court of First Instance
and OHIM seeking trademark registration for square dishwashing tablets with slightly rounded edges and corners.225 Sticking
to the “significant departure criterion,” in its proceeding, the
court incorporated a new complementary rule to the law of shape
marks distinctiveness.226 Bearing in mind that the shape in question was composed of various visual elements, the court presumed that “the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a
whole and does not proceed to analyze its various details ....
Thus, in order to assess whether or not a trade mark has any
distinctive character, the overall impression given by it must be
considered.”227 What the court ruled was not an unprecedented
finding in EU trademark law.228 The CJEU had already ruled
this normative criterion with the same parties but in a different
context.229 In actuality, it traced back to Procter & Gamble Co.
(Baby-Dry) in which the applicant filed an application to register
BABY-DRY as a word mark.230 Under appeal, the CJEU found
that that combination of words is too descriptive considering the
type of product that the words were supposed to be used for.231 By
the same token, the court held that in regard to the marks which
are composed of separable words, the descriptiveness should be
examined “not only in relation to each word taken separately but
also in relation to the whole which they form.”232 On this account,
the CJEU concluded that “[a]ny perceptible difference between the
combination of words” and the common language among the relevant consumers may result in finding distinctive character.233
Indeed, the CJEU in Procter & Gamble Co. (Dishwashing tablets) had realized that the “significant departure criterion” is
merely pertinent to the comparison between a shape or design and
the other comparable ones in the relevant sector.234 Meanwhile,
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226 See id.
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228 See Case C-383/99 P, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Off. for Harmonisation
in the Internal Mkt., 2001 E.C.R. I-6279, ¶ 44.
229 Id.
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231 See id.
232 Id. ¶ 40.
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they knew that any appraisal of a shape or design’s own visual
elements entails an independent customized criterion.235 For
that purpose, the CJEU implanted a modified version of the
Baby-Dry’s rule, as a word mark rule, into the scope of shape
marks’ distinctiveness.236 In doing so, the court excluded “any
perceptible difference” as the part that may act in contradiction
to the “significant departure criterion”237 and then held that in
assessing the distinctive character of a product shape or design
that is composed of various visual elements the way that those
elements are combined is far more important than the sum of its
parts.238 Subsequently, in Mag Instrument Inc. the CJEU reinforced exclusion of “any perceptible” factor when the appellant
tried to employ it in justifying the distinctive character for the mark
at issue.239 In that case, citing the Baby-Dry’s rule, the appellant
argued that any perceptible difference in relation to other common
shapes or designs in the relevant sector is sufficient to conclude that
a shape or design is not devoid of any distinctive character.240 In
response, the court found that that minimal distinctiveness
threshold is inapplicable in the case of shape marks’ distinctiveness.241 Finally, the court implicitly rejected this argument not
only through reiterating the essentials of the significant departure criterion but also by affirming that the only applicable part
of Baby-Dry’s rule concerning shape marks is the requirement of
overall impression assessment.242
The Baby-Dry’s heritage did not culminate in Mag Instrument Inc.243 The CJEU, in several relevant cases, has followed

See id. ¶ 35.
See id.
237 See David T. Keeling, About Kinetic Watches, Easy Banking, and Nappies
That Keep a Baby Dry: A Review of Recent European Case Law on Absolute
Grounds for Refusal to Register Trade Marks, 2003 INTELL PROP. Q. 130–31 (2003).
238 See Case C-191/01 P, Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. v.
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 2003 E.C.R. I-12447, ¶ 33; Case C-150/02 P, Streamserve Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-1463,
¶ 14; Case T-399/02, Eurocermex SA v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. II-1395, ¶ 19.
239 Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. Off. For Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 78.
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242 See id. ¶ 36.
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this normative criterion which, had already been developed in
wordmark cases.244 In Eurocermex SA the CJEU reaffirmed that
a composite mark’s distinctive character could not be examined
in isolation from the details that constitute its parts.245 According to this view, any separable variant or difference, even a significant one, will not make it qualified enough to be considered
distinctive; because, as a whole, what does matter is how the
elements are combined, not the elements separately.246 The reverse
holds true in the CJEU settled case law.247 In Timehouse GmbH,
the CJEU held that in the case of a composite mark the distinctive
character “might be partly assessed for each of its elements taken
separately; however, it should not be presumed that elements which
are not in isolation of any distinctive character cannot, once combined have such character.”248 It is worth noting that the “overall impression” rule in shape marks’ distinctiveness plays not
only a supplementary role in respect to “significant departure
criterion” but also the same function in terms of contextualization.249 To be more clear, along with the element of “market appraisal,” as an instrument to assess distinctiveness in regard to
other shapes or designs, the rule of “overall impression” has paved
the way to assess the distinctive character of a shape or design
in relation to itself.250
B. The U.S. Courts’ Historical Struggle on Choice of Test
Comparing to EU trademark law, the interplay between
word marks’ provisions and trade dress marks’ distinctiveness in
U.S. trademark law has been posed in a completely different

Case T-399/02, Eurocermex SA v. Off. For Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. II-1395, ¶¶ 19, 51.
245 Id. ¶ 51.
246 Id.
247 Case C-453/11 P, Timehouse GmbH v. Off. For Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt., ECLI:EU:C:2012:291, ¶ 40 (May 14, 2012).
248 Id.; see also Case C-445/13 P, Voss of Nor. ASA v. Off. For Harmonisation
in the Internal Mkt., ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 91 (May 7, 2015); Case C-363/99,
E.C.R. I-1619, Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v. Benelux Merkenbureau,
2004 E.C.R. 1651, ¶¶ 99–100; Case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie BV v. Benelux
Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. 1705, ¶¶ 40–41.
249 See Ramírez-Montes, supra note 65, at 351–52.
250 Id. at 345–47, 351–52.
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theme.251 Unlike EU trademark law in which—as explained
earlier—the CJEU has employed word marks’ distinctiveness as
a supplemental criterion, in U.S. trademark law, the relationship
between word marks and shape marks provisions is a matter of
choice.252 Indeed, the U.S. courts had a historical disagreement on
the applicability of different available tests in the case of trade
dress marks.253 As a result, until the Supreme Court’s decision
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,254 each one of the U.S.
courts preferred one of the ontological or conventional tests in
trade dress cases.255 As a matter of law, U.S. courts employ the
Abercrombie test ordinarily as a conventional test for assessing the
distinctive character of trademarks.256 Judge Friendly originally
designed this test, which was initially accorded to word marks, in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. to classify marks
into five main categories, including (I) generic; (II) descriptive; (III)
suggestive; (IV) arbitrary; or (V) fanciful.257 Accordingly, all categories except descriptive and generic marks are capable of establishing inherent distinctiveness.258 On the contrary, descriptive marks’
protection is subject to proof of secondary meaning, and generic
marks could not essentially function as a distinctive trademark.259

Compare Case C-383/99 P, Procter & Gamble Co. v. Off. for Harmonisation
in the Internal Mkt., 2001 E.C.R. I-6279, ¶ 40, with Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 173–74 (1995).
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In the U.S. legal context, what divided U.S. courts into two opponent groups with ontological or traditional approaches emanated
from the question of whether Abercrombie test can accurately
help to determine distinctive character in trade dress marks.260
That disagreement among lower courts regarding the applicability of Abercrombie test for trade dress marks referred to
the Supreme Court, first in Two Pesos.261 Rejecting the historical
requirement of showing secondary meaning for nontechnical
marks,262 the Court held there is no legal or empirical ground to
believe that a product shape or packaging could not inherently
designate a specific commercial origin.263 It reinforced this understanding, stating that “recognition of an inherently distinctive
trademark or trade dress acknowledges the owner’s legitimate
proprietary interest in its unique and valuable informational device,
regardless of whether substantial consumer association yet bestows the additional empirical protection of secondary meaning.”264
Relying on the premise that “trademarks and trade dress under
[section] 43(a) serves the same statutory purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition,” it held that “[t]here is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis” toward their distinctive
character.265 The Court based its holding on the unconditional
language of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act according any sign “by
which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others” could potentially be protected as a trademark.266

See Rohit A. Sabnis, Note, Product Configuration Trade Dress and
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marks are categorized under the concept of descriptive marks. See HOPKINS,
supra note 262, § 3.
263 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773–74.
264 Id. at 770–71 (quoting Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932
F.2d 1113, 1120 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991)).
265 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773.
266 Id. at 772 (quoting Lanham Trademark Protection Act § 43(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1052). In spite of speared tendency of lower courts in requiring proof
260
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On the same account, the Court concluded there was no legal or
practical problem with using a language-based test (Abercrombie
test) for a visual mark.267 Nonetheless, the Court did not clarify
the rational upon which normative or empirical presumption it
concluded that a language-based test could be applied for a visual-based subject matter.268 Besides, the Court ignored this unchallengeable fact that having shared objectives of trade dress
marks and word marks may not justify applying the same test
for them.269 This practical gap in its findings resulted in the
Court’s failure to explain the mechanism through which the
Abercrombie test should be applied for trade dress marks.270 For
instance, it found that an arbitrary package, like an distinctive.271 However, it did not define how examiners or courts could
find out whether a product packaging is arbitrary.272 Shortly
after Two Pesos, Justice Breyer used a similar terminology in
Qualitex, however, not in favor of employing the Abercrombie
test for trade dress marks.273 Indeed, he used the elements of the
Abercrombie test for drawing an analogy between word marks and
trade dress marks.274 For instance he found that “a product’s

of secondary meaning, some courts support suitability of trade dress to be
considered inherently distinctive. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 696 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that trade
dress in the form of packaging could be protected under the Lanham Act
without showing secondary meaning).
267 McKenna, supra note 97, at 848 (stating “it is relatively easy for courts
to determine whether and how those meanings relate to the products or services with which they are used. But product design and packaging features rarely
have such generally understood meanings, and as a result, the traditional
framework is less helpful.”).
268 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 785 (Thomas, J., concurring); The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 661–62.
269 The Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 656 (noting that “assimilationists properly attribute to product design trade dress protection the same positive
values as are assigned to trademark protection of words, and thus accord shapes
equivalent protection as source-identifier. But this model fails to acknowledge
the important differences between words and shapes.”).
270 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768–74.
271 See id. at 768 (finding marks classified as suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful “are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection.”)
272 Id.
273 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–64; see also The
Death of Ontology, supra note 25, at 661–62.
274 Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162–63.
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color is unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or designs, which almost automatically tell a consumer that they
refer to brand.”275 In the course of defining the span of the subject at issue, namely a color alone, the Court held that “a color
that in context seems unusual, such as pink on a firm’s insulating material ... would have come to identify and distinguish the
goods ... much in the way that descriptive words on a product ...
can come to indicate a product’s origin.”276
Indeed, some lower courts before and subsequent to the
Supreme Court’s findings in Two Pesos and Qualitex strived to
implement the Abercrombie test in the relevant proceedings.277
However, the lower courts never succeeded in transplanting the essentials of the Abercrombie test into trade dress distinctiveness.278
One of the remarkable endeavors to engraft the Abercrombie test
into trade dress distinctiveness was in Ashley Furniture.279 In
this case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals tried to articulate
an explanatory and luminous outline of using the Abercrombie
test for trade dress marks.280 In this course, the Court employed
analogy to prove that it is not inherently impossible to use a
language-based test to investigate distinctive character in product
shapes or designs and packaging.281 It exemplified its findings

Id.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
277 See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659
F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding it unnecessary to always find secondary
meaning with all trade dress suits); Jeffrey Millstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth,
Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 31–34 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the test for greeting cards’ designs); Best Cellars, Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431,
451 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]rade dress is classified on a spectrum of increasing
distinctiveness as generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary/fanciful”);
Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672–73 (8th Cir. 1997)
(drilling equipment); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 785 (8th
Cir. 1995) (adopting the Abercrombie test in determining inherent distinctiveness
for all types of trade dress cases); Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890
F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (playground equipment); Roulo v. Russ
Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (greeting cards); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608–09 (7th Cir. 1986) (slogans);
Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 366,
366–70 (4th Cir. 1999) (furniture).
278 Sabnis, supra note 260, at 193–98.
279 187 F.3d at 371.
280 Id. at 369–71.
281 Id. at 370.
275
276
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noting that “a banana-flavored candy, for example, would be
generic if the candy were round, descriptive if it were shaped like a
banana, suggestive if it were shaped like a monkey, arbitrary if
it were shaped like a trombone, and fanciful if it were formed
into some hitherto unknown shape.”282 Nonetheless, it did not
specify that according to which contractual source of meanings
that those shapes may comprise.283 Besides, it did not provide
any protocol according to which one can recognize the shapes or
designs’ spot among Abercrombie’s categories.284 Finally, the
Supreme Court, in Wal-Mart, put an end to this confusion.285 In
the opinion, Justice Scalia held that, unlike the word marks and
product packaging that could “almost automatically tell a consumer that [they] refer[ ] to a brand,” product shapes or designs
“invariably serve purposes other than source identification.”286
During the trial Justice Scalia, like Justice Breyer in Qualitex,
used Abercrombie test solely for the sake of analogical reasoning
and did not recognize its applicability for trade dress marks.287
Then, after finding the Lanham Act section 43(a) does not require any pre-intended protocol on the method of assessing the
distinctive character of trade dress marks, the Court held that
product shapes or designs must show secondary meaning to be
legally protectable as a federal trademark.288
IV.THE COMPETITIVE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
A. Shape Marks Distinctiveness and Competitive Concerns in the
EU Context
According to the CJEU’s settled case law, the European
tribunals are required to interpret the absolute refusal grounds
by contemplating the possible public and competitive interests.289

Id.
Id.
284 Id. at 370–73.
285 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
286 Id. at 212–13 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 162–63 (1995)).
287 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 212–13.
288 Id. at 216.
289 Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions—
und Vertriebs GmbH v. Boots—und Segelzubehör Walter Huber, 1999 E.C.R.
282
283



2021] SHAPE MARK (TRADE DRESS) DISTINCTIVENESS 111
At the same time, for any specific public interests, depending on
the selected refusal ground, courts have to investigate special
considerations.290 Indeed, the element of public interest had no
explicit precedent in the relevant legislatures.291 However, some
regulations were utilized by CJEU to extract the principle of
public and competitive interests.292 In the case of distinctive
character, Article 4(1)(c)(former 3(1)(c)) of the Directive excludes
the registration-ability of signs “which consist exclusively of signs
or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind,
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin,
or the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or services.”293 In
Windsurfing Chiemsee the CJEU used Article 4(1)(c)(former
3(1)(c)) as a base to rule that “descriptive signs” should remain
in the public domain and be kept free to be used by all.294 It was
devised actually to prevent competitors from unfair monopolization of descriptive signs that should be freely available for all.295
Subsequently, in Wrigley Jr., the CJEU held the descriptive
character should be examined not only based on its current use
but also its possible future use.296 Comparing to other forms of
intellectual property protection, keeping the descriptive signs in
the public domain is more important because of the possibility of
perpetual protecting simply by continuing market use.297

I-2779, ¶ 25; Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 77; Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV
v. Benelux Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 50.
290 Joined Cases C-456/01 P & C-457/01 P, Henkel KGaA v. Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2003 E.C.R. I-5092, ¶ 46; Case C-37/03 P,
BioID AG v. Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2005 E.C.R. I-8004,
¶ 59; Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v. Off. For Harmonisation in the
Internal Mkt., 2006 E.C.R. I-568, ¶ 59.
291 Fhima, supra note 68, at 311 (describing European trademark law pre2017).
292 Case C-104/01, ¶¶ 50–54.
293 Council Directive 2015/2436, supra note 15, at art. 4(1), 7.
294 Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, ¶ 25.
295 Fhima, supra note 68, at 318.
296 Case C-191/01 P, Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt. v. Wm.
Wrigley Jr. Co., 2003 E.C.R. I-12447, ¶ 32.
297 Fhima, supra note 68, at 312–13.
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Eventually, the principle of equal treatment amounted to
posing the question of whether shape marks’ distinctiveness should
be assessed in light of public interests or not.298 In response to
this question, the CJEU in Linde ruled that the principle of
keeping the descriptive signs available for all is applicable for
shape marks as much as any other kinds of trademarks.299 Nevertheless, it did not specify how a product shape or design might be
found descriptive without having access to a contractual source
of meanings like the language-based marks.300 The CJEU made it
vaguer when in Procter & Gamble Co. (Dishwashing tablets), it
ruled that novelty of a shape or design will not guarantee its
non-descriptiveness.301 In this regard, some scholars rightly argue
that applying descriptiveness as a tool for implementing the competition policies into shape marks distinctiveness will not provide us with an operable solution.302 Professor Kur, for instance,
observes that “shapes are descriptive in a strict sense only in
exceptional cases.”303 Therefore, bearing in mind the incompatibility between descriptiveness, as a concept related to traditional
marks, and the nature of shape marks distinctiveness will make
it restrained in terms of competition concerns.304
The competitive concerns about shape mark distinctiveness were addressed, specifically in Libertel.305 In this case, the
CJEU found that the descriptiveness of color per se marks and
their limited number are sound bases to safeguard colors’ strict
availability for other competitors.306 By the same token, the court
argued that color monopoly might provide traders with an unjustified competitive advantage which will detrimentally distort

Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG v. Winward Indus. Inc.,
2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 26(2).
299 Id. ¶¶ 71–77.
300 Id.
301 See Joined Cases C-468/01 P to C-472/01 P, Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Off. for Harmonisation in the Internal Mkt., 2004 E.C.R. I-5092, ¶ 30.
302 Too Splendid, supra note 118, at 2.
303 Id. at 5.
304 Id.
305 See Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux Merkenbureau, 2003
E.C.R. I-3822, ¶¶ 20, 54–56, 71.
306 Id. ¶ 66.
298
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competition.307 Although, it does not bar traders from exclusive
protection after establishing acquired distinctiveness through a
successful market use.308 Some believe that the CJEU’s findings in
Libertel emanated from the need for filling the gaps that the functionality doctrine may not cover in terms of the necessity of keeping
designs available for all.309 However, whatever the reason was,
the fact remains that the CJEU did not clarify why and how the
public and competitive concerns will be removed after successful
commercial use.310 As a principle, if the public and competitive
interests matter, their essential value could not be considered
transient or temporary.311 Accordingly, how could commercial use
(acquired distinctiveness) remove the necessity of public and competitive considerations? This Article suggests that paradox comes
from the inapplicability of distinctiveness provisions for the policy
of keeping resources with limited supply available for all.312 This
inapplicability made more complicated when in Henkel Perwoll
Bottle, the availability of descriptive product shapes for other
competitors merged with the “significant departure criterion.”313
This merger paved the way for CJEU to actively figure the consumers’ and producers’ behavior in the European market, with
surveillance on the potential competitive concerns.314 However,

Id. ¶ 54.
308 Council Regulation 2017/1001, supra note 15, at art. 7(1)–(3); Council
Directive 2015/2436, supra note 15, at art. 4(4), 1; Too Splendid, supra note
118, at 1, 20 (observing that acquired distinctiveness would not be useful “[f]rom
a competition as well as from a general economic point of view,” because “[i]t
would lead to an increase in the number of registered marks, and thereby
inevitably also to more monitoring and litigation, and to the costs and efforts
this implies”).
309 S.M. Maniatis, Whither European Trade Mark Law? Arsenal and Davidoff:
The Creative Disorder Stage, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99, 114 (2003).
310 See Case C-104/01, ¶ 67.
311 See Too Splendid, supra note 118, at 8.
312 Id. at 3.
313 Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und Markenamt,
2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶¶ 48–49.
314 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 889–90 (2004) (arguing that trademark law frequently encounters with two essential questions;
first “[s]hould trademark law be structured reactively to protect whatever
consumer understandings or producer goodwill develops, or should it proactively
307



114 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:071
the question of how distinctiveness can help to reflect the anticompetitive concerns has still been left unanswered.315
B. Trade Dress Marks as a Subsection of Unfair Competition
Compared to EU trade mark law, the relationship between
shape mark protection and competition law has taken a different path in U.S. trademark law.316 Indeed, unlike EU trademark
law in which public and competitive considerations are parts of
a whole, in U.S. law, trade dress protection originally emanated
from competition law.317 From a historical point of view, since nineteenth century the question of competitive consequences of exclusive protection of product designs has caused hot debates among
U.S. courts.318 In its very nature, designs were public assets that
no one could possess exclusively;319 therefore copying other’s unregistered product shapes or packagings was merely protected
through common law action against unfair commercial practices
that may put a trader’s rivals in a disadvantaged competitive
position.320 Hence, the separation between trademark and trade
dress springs from the historical separation between the law of
unfair competition and trademarks.321 However, by passage of time
the expansion of the protective scope of U.S. trademark law led

seek to shape the ways in which consumers shop and producers sell or seek to
acquire rights, thus shaping how the economy functions?”).
315 See Too Splendid, supra note 118, at 3–4 (observing that even the significant departure criterion reflects the competitive concerns that should
essentially be responded through functionality doctrine).
316 Compare Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee
Produktions—und Vertriebs GmbH v. Boots—und Segelzubehör Walter Huber,
1999 E.C.R. I-2779, ¶¶ 25–27, and Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs.
NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 77, and Case
C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822,
¶ 54, with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 1995).
317 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 1995).
318 Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky. 73, 84 (1883); Sicilia Di R. Biebow &
Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 1984); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2000).
319 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1995); MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 1:24; MOHR ET AL., supra note 70, at 11.
320 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8:1.
321 Id.
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to conferring trademark protection to trade dress.322 In this respect,
the Senate Report explains that “[s]ince the [Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act’s] enactment in 1946 ... it has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a federal law of unfair competition. For example, it has been applied to cases involving the
infringement of unregistered marks, violations of trade dress
and certain nonfunctional configurations of goods and actionable
false advertising claims.”323 Just like its European counterparts,
the U.S. courts strongly tend to be cautious to not allow that
exclusive trademark protection of the limited supply designs results
in depriving the competitors of free competition and the public of
free access.324 In response to that competition policy the U.S.
courts in their proceedings have divided trade dress marks into
two groups in terms of the required type of distinctiveness.325 In
other words, unlike EU trademark law in which both acquired
and inherent distinctiveness are welcomed for shape marks’
registration, the U.S. courts in their settled case law have
strived to utilized distinctiveness as a normative tool to meet the
public and competitive considerations.326 For instance, arguing
in favor of the necessity of establishing secondary meaning for
product shapes, Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart Stores found that
consumers should take advantage of utilitarian and esthetic features that product design may comprise.327 He continued holding

Id.
323 S. REP. NO. 100-515, supra note 23, at 40; see also Kipling v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 120 F. 631, 636 (2d Cir. 1903); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (The term “trade-mark [ ] includes any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof [adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant] to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from
those manufactured or sold by others.”).
324 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir.
1917) (arguing that “it is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that
the plaintiff ... show that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to
mean that some particular person ... makes them, and that the public cares
who does make them, and not merely for their appearance and structure”).
325 Compare Crescent Tool Co., 247 F. at 300, with Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770–71 (1992) (quoting Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc., v.
Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991)) (approving of distinction between inherent and acquired distinctiveness).
326 Compare Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent—und
Markenamt, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 51, with Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 770–71
(quoting Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc., 932 F.2d at 1120 n.7).
327 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 209, 213 (2000).
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that the competitive state should be preserved against the potential
suits upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.328 In this view, the
exclusionary function of trademark law and its direct competitive
effect has motivated courts329 to find a way to assure that a shape
or design’s registration, as common materials, will not unduly
prevent others from “availability of substantially equivalent units
that permits the normal operation of supply and demand to yield
the fair price society must pay for a given commodity.”330 On this
account, requiring secondary meaning for product dresses could
perform as an instrument to assure that the shape or design at
issue will not result in excessive harm in terms of free competition.331 Accordingly, successful market use (secondary meaning)
will provide courts with a convincing legal base to presume that
a product shape or design has been transformed from a common
asset to an exclusive private belonging that does not comprise
any undesirable competitive effect.332 As a traditional legal principle, that approach has sprung from the natural rights theory of
property according to which the trademark system, as a propertybased structure, has been developed to protect exclusive trademark right “only within a particular field of trade and as against
direct competitors.”333

Id. at 213 (finding that “[t]he very closeness will suggest the existence
of relatively small utility in adopting an inherent-distinctiveness principle,
and relatively great consumer benefit in requiring a demonstration of secondary meaning”).
329 See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1984) (suggesting that “[t]he wide range of available packaging and design
options allows a producer to appropriate a distinctive identity without unduly
hindering his competitors’ ability to compete”); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn &
Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917) (arguing that “it is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the plaintiff ... show that the appearance of
his wares has in fact come to mean that some particular person ... makes them,
and that the public cares who does make them, and not merely for their appearance and structure”).
330 MCCARTHY, supra note 71, § 8:1 (observing that “in the absence of legally defined exclusive rights, imitation and copying is permitted and in fact,
encouraged, as an essential element of free competition: ‘Imitation is the life
blood of competition’”).
331 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 214.
332 Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1888–89 (2007).
333 Id. at 1841.
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Within that legal framework in which the trademark system
should serve fair competition against unfair commercial practices,
trade dress marks should be protected in balance with the public’s “right to copy” of available designs in the field.334 As Justice
Kennedy observed in Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, “[t]rade
dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many
instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products .... [Therefore,] copying is not always discouraged or disfavored
by the laws which preserve” competitive economy.335 Indeed, locating trade dress protection as subsection of “unfair competition
law leads to the thought that the interests of the trademark holder
have to be taken into account on equal terms with those of competitors and consumers.”336 However, that policy-based approach,
unlike the European more fact-based approach, will lead to employ
trademark provisions, in our case distinctiveness, as competitive
tools that are examined in isolation from commercial context.337
The first critique that may come to mind is that distinctive character is a matter of fact that no one can, even producers or courts,
alter it without changing facts.338 In other words, the question of
whether a product design or shape is an indicative or esthetic
could solely be addressed by referring to the consumers’ perception
within a real commercial environment.339 However, this Article

Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co. [1889] 598 Q.B. 626 (UK)
(“Competition exists when two or more persons seek to possess or to enjoy
this same thing: it follows that the success of one must be the failure of another, and no principle of law enables us to interfere with or to moderate that
success or that failure so long as it is due to mere competition.”).
335 532 U.S. 23, 23–29 (2001).
336 Apostolos Chronopoulos, Trade Dress Rights as Instruments of Monopolistic Competition: Towards a Rejuvenation of the Misappropriation Doctrine
in Unfair Competition Law and a Property Theory of Trademarks, 16 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 119, 128 (2012).
337 Compare Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee
Produktions—und Vertriebs GmbH (WSC) v. Boots—und Segelzubehör Walter
Huber, ¶¶ 25–27 (May 4, 1999), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text
=&docid=44567&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=1942292 [https://perma.cc/9CYE-PC6Z], with Chronopoulos, supra note
336, at 127.
338 See Chronopoulos, supra note 336, at 127–28.
339 Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (“[T]he determination
whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive cannot be made in a vacuum; it is
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suggests a legal framework employing external realities, like distinctiveness requirement, as a normative instrument for a proactive policy-making is not an undesirable or impossible approach.340
CONCLUSION
The concept of distinctiveness plays a prominent role in
articulation of the trademark system in different jurisdictions.341
In recent years, the expanding scope of modern trademark protection has caused hot debates in U.S. and EU law regarding the
appropriate methods of implementing the essential trademark
concepts for the new generation of trademarks.342 One of the
challenging issues is related to applying the factor of distinctiveness for shape marks.343 Both U.S. and EU trademark law
have been trying to address the question of inherent distinctiveness based upon twofold criteria in which the interplay between
the innate characteristics of the in-question shape mark and
public perception plays a central role.344 However, both the U.S.
“ontological tests” and EU “significant departure criterion” suffer from the heavy emphasis on the “distinguishing” capability
among other comparable shapes or designs and ignorance of the
“source-identifying” function of shape marks.345 Furthermore,
their endeavors for posing the question of inherent distinctiveness in a contextual environment will make the normative parts
of the tests useless and cause time and cost expenditures.346
Simultaneously, even though the requirement of showing secondary meaning for product shapes or designs in U.S. trademark

necessary to surmise the mental process of those in the marketplace at whom
the mark is directed.”).
340 See Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 57, at 345.
341 See STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING, supra note 5, at 66.
342 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 209, 213
(2000); Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, ¶¶ 25–27.
343 See Harmonization of Trademark Law, supra note 28, at 26.
344 See, e.g., In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. 566, 568
(T.T.A.B. 1977) (“[T]he question of ‘inherently distinctive’ obviously must be
determined in relation to ... the reaction of purchasers to the shape, and what
would be the anticipated reaction of the average purchaser to this shape.”);
see also Too Splendid, supra note 118, at 26.
345 See Beebe, supra note 90, at 52.
346 See Smith, supra note 186, at 302; Fhima, supra note 68, at 685.
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law is a more reliable path to investigate the public perception, the
historical precedent in U.S. law indicates that this requirement
is mainly for competitive consideration.347 Actually, the indefinite
nature of shape marks or trade dress marks and lack of a definitive
and pre-intended source of meaning has made them unpredictable
in terms of distinctiveness examination.348 Accordingly, in our sense
the question of shape mark distinctiveness should be addressed
solely upon a market-led approach in which the collected information from the relevant consumers is decisive in finding distinctive character.349
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